Often groups need to meet repeatedly before a decision is reached. Hence, most individual decisions will be contingent on decisions taken previously by others. In particular, the decision to cooperate or not will depend on one's own assessment of what constitutes a fair group outcome. Making use of a repeated N-person prisoner's dilemma, we show that reciprocation towards groups opens a window of opportunity for cooperation to thrive, leading populations to engage in dynamics involving both coordination and coexistence, and characterized by cycles of cooperation and defection. Furthermore, we show that this process leads to the emergence of fairness, whose level will depend on the dilemma at stake.
Many problems of cooperation among humans boil down to the dilemma of helping others at a cost to ourselves or refraining from doing so while still profiting from the help provided by others [1] [2] [3] . Surprisingly often we take the first option, even though rational considerations encourage us not to [1, 2] . This talent for cooperation forms one of the cornerstones of human society and is, as such, also largely responsible for the unprecedented success of our species [4] . But how did evolution succeed in shaping such cooperative beings, if the temptation to free ride on the benefits produced by others is always lurking? This paradox of cooperation [5] has been under intense scrutiny for decades and, fortunately, several mechanisms discourage us from actually giving in to this temptation [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] . Physicists have investigated some of these mechanisms (for an excellent review, see [8] ), as human cooperation constitutes an excellent example of a complex system. Cooperation may, for instance, be worthwhile if your opponent has the chance to return you the favor later on. If he or she is not willing to do so, his or her cheating behavior can still be retaliated. This is Robert Trivers' direct reciprocity at work [16] . Theoretical and empirical studies show that individuals who pursue long-term relationships built on mutual cooperation are expected to prevail [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] . In this context, tit-for-tat players constitute the most famous example [17] : They always start by cooperating, subsequently repeating their opponent's last move.
Direct reciprocation may enhance cooperation for pairwise interactions, but when larger groups of actors are involved, decision-making becomes much more complex. Similar to the relation between 2-body and many-body interactions in Physics, also in human decisions there is a significant increase in complexity when going from pairwise cooperative game interactions to collective efforts in sizable groups. Technically, such an increase in complexity is reflected in the number of possible behavioral equilibria, which scales linearly with the group size [22] , even in the absence of reactive players. Moreover, it is far from clear under which conditions a cooperator (defector) should switch to defection (cooperation) when engaged in a repeated collective endeavor, wherein some may cooperate while others defect. To whom should one reciprocate [23] ? One possibility is to reciprocate towards the entire group. As in previous studies of evolution and assessment of fair offers [24] [25] [26] [27] , reciprocating towards groups will depend on what is reckoned as a fair collective effort, as individuals may develop an aspiration level above which they cooperate, defecting otherwise. Such individuals constitute a N-person generalization of the 2-person reciprocators. Unsurprisingly, the spectrum of possible reciprocator strategies for group, N-person game interactions, is much larger than in the 2-person case. Some reciprocators may, for instance, be willing to cooperate only if the entire group did so in a previous encounter, whereas others may cooperate also in the presence of group members who defected.
Let us consider group decisions involving N individuals described in terms of the repeated N-person prisoner's dilemma (NPD) [28, 29] , in which all players have the opportunity to contribute a certain amount c (''cost'') to the public good. The accumulated amount is multiplied by an investment factor F and subsequently shared equally among all group members, irrespective of their contribution. This entire process repeats itself with a probability w, resulting in an average number of hri ¼ ð1 À wÞ À1 rounds per group [5, 30] . The outcome of the game may differ from round to round, as individuals can base their decision to contribute on the result of the previous round. We distinguish N different aspiration levels, encoded in terms of the strategies R M (M 2 f1; . . . ; Ng). R M players always contribute in the first round. Subsequently, they contribute only if at least M players did contribute in the previous round. The threshold M can be regarded as their own perception of a fair number of contributions to the public good. In addition to these N different types of reciprocators, we include the strategy AD (always defect) to account for unconditional defectors.
Let us start by assuming an infinitely large population of individuals, where a fraction x of the population plays R M -allowing one single value of M in the set of all reciprocators-while the remaining fraction plays AD. This will allow us to define the notation before addressing finite populations and an evolving M, while unveiling a dynamical scenario which differs strongly from the one obtained from (repeated) 2-person games. Behavioral dynamics often relies on individuals' propensity to be influenced by the actions and achievements of others. Such social learning or evolutionary dynamics can be described by the replicator equation [31] 
stand for the fitness-or success-of R M (AD) players, given by their payoff derived from the game group interactions (see Eq. 1 in [32] ).
A little algebra allows us to show that the (deterministic) replicator dynamics leads to scenarios in which cooperation may prevail, in connection with at most two internal fixed points, associated with unstable (coordination, x Ã L ) and stable (coexistence, x Ã R ) equilibria, which depend on the values of w, M, N, and F (for detailed derivations, see Section 1 in [32] ). Intuitively, the simultaneous occurrence of these two equilibria, which happens when we face a repeated NPD (F < N), can be explained as follows. If the R M frequency is smaller than x Ã L , there are only a few groups in which R M players remain cooperative for the entire duration of the game. The benefits they receive from such interactions are insufficient to cover the cost for always being prepared to cooperate in the first round, making them disadvantageous with respect to ADs. Hence, R M players will only endure as long as their prevalence remains above a minimum fraction x Ã L , representing an unstable fixed point (coordination). But even if they succeed, they will never take over the entire population, unless M ¼ N. As long as M < N, R M players will cooperate in partially cooperative groups, opening an escape hatch to the survival of a small fraction of ADs (a fraction 1 À x Ã R ), reflecting the stable coexistence between the two strategies.
Additional insight in the characterization of x Ã L and x Ã R is provided in Fig. 1 which shows that, for given M=N, there is a critical probability w above which the two equilibria emerge.
w increases as we reduce M=N, meaning that more rounds are required to prevent AD from dominating the population. Naturally, the location of x Ã L and x Ã R follows the same trend, creating an interesting, but delicate, balance between the size of the basin of attraction of the coexistence state x Ã R and its actual value. Relaxing the criterium of fairness for reciprocators (lowering M) makes the cooperative basin of attraction easier to reach (by reducing x Ã L ), but less cooperative overall (reduction of x Ã R ). So far, we have investigated the competition between a single type of reciprocators and unconditional defectors. However, the assessment of what constitutes a fair level of cooperation in a group does not need to be unanimous in the population: The value of M itself may be under selective pressure, and in this case, the delicate competition just described becomes particularly important, mostly if we take into account that populations are finite [11] and selection is not free from errors of imitation [12, 13, 33] and behavioral mutations [14] .
Let us then consider a population of finite size Z, and compute the average prevalence of each of the N þ 1 available strategies-AD plus the N different R M strategies-over time. We implement a stochastic, finite population analogue of the deterministic evolutionary dynamics defined before, in which strategies evolve according to a mutation-selection process defined in discrete time. At each time step, the strategy of one randomly selected individual A is updated. With probability , A suffers a mutation, adopting a strategy drawn randomly from the space of N þ 1 available strategies; with probability 1 À , another randomly selected individual B acts as a role model for A: The probability that A adopts the strategy of B is given by the Fermi distribution p ¼ ½1 þ e ðf A Àf B Þ À1 [8, 12, 33, 34] , where f A (f B ) denotes the fitness of individual A (B) and ! 0 measures the strength of the fitness contribution to the update process, i.e., the so-called intensity of selection [12] .
In the limit in which mutations are rare, we are able to compute analytically the relative prevalence of each of the different strategies [15, 21, 35] (for details, see Section 2 of [32] ). This simplified limit turns out to be valid over a much wider interval of mutation regimes, as we show below via numerical simulations. In this limit, the population will either end up wiping out the mutant or witness the fixation of the intruder long before the occurrence of a new mutation. Hence, there will be a maximum of two strategies present simultaneously in the population. The fixation probabilities of all possible mutants in all (otherwise) monomorphic populations can be readily computed analytically [12, 15, 32] , defining a reduced (embedded) Markov chain, with which we compute the stationary distribution of the population, i.e., the average fraction of time the population spends in each of the N þ 1 monomorphic configurations of the population [32, 35] .
The results are shown in Fig. 2 (a), where we plot the stationary distribution for different values of the parameter F. The distribution of R M players reveals some remarkable features: On one hand, there is a specific concept of fairness, associated with an aspiration level M Ã whose corresponding strategy R M Ã is most favored by evolution, being the most prevalent among all R M strategies. On the other hand, unanimity in the assessment of fairness does not occur, given that several values of M may coexist in the population. Finally, as the dilemma becomes harsher (lower values of F), the higher the fraction of the population that adopts the most prevalent assessment of fairness-M Ã -which is always much smaller than the group size N [see also Fig. 3(a) ]. Naturally, the success of AD players increases with decreasing F [36] .
The intuition behind the emergence of an optimal level of fairness M can be understood with the help of Fig. 2(b) , where we analyze the typical flow of probability between the different monomorphic states. Arrows represent transitions favored by natural selection, i.e., those whose fixation probability exceeds 1=Z (associated with the fixation probability of a mutant under neutral evolution). Suppose we start from a homogeneous population of ADs. Figure 2 Irrespective of the success of AD players, which decreases with increasing F, there is always an optimal threshold M Ã , whose corresponding strategy R M Ã is the most prevalent (w ¼ 0:9,
The percentages indicate the fraction of time the population spends in each composition of the population (F ¼ 4:25). Arrows indicate transitions whose fixation probability is greater than N ¼ 1=Z. One observes oscillations between cooperation and defection. The population moves from R M with small M, over AD, back to R M with moderate threshold. Neutral drift may bring us back to R M with small M, as emphasized using gray dotted lines. Dashed lines indicate the stationary distribution in the small-mutation limit. Each symbol indicates, for a given mutation probability, the fraction of the population that adopts the corresponding strategy, averaged over the simulation time (30 simulations, each lasting for 10 9 iterations; w ¼ 0:9, N ¼ 5, Z ¼ 100, ¼ 0:05; our results are robust to changes in [32] ).
over the population again (open red arrows). Hence, the population oscillates continuously between cooperation and defection, resembling the cycles of war and peace similar in spirit to those identified in the context of repeated 2-person games of cooperation [21] . This scenario constitutes a general feature of the present model, and is not the result of a particular choice of the average number of rounds hri (or w) or mutation probability , as demonstrated in Fig. 3 . Figure 3(a) shows that, irrespective of the number of rounds hri, AD abounds when F is small, R M with M ¼ 2 when F is large (but still smaller than the group size N), and R M with M ¼ 3 for intermediate values of F, which corresponds exactly to the findings reported in Fig. 2(a) . In other words, evolution shapes the population assessment of fairness, depending on the constraints imposed by the collective dilemma. In Fig. 3(b) we investigate the robustness of our results with respect to changes in . We abandon the limit of rare mutations, and determine the stationary distributions for arbitrary mutation rates via computer simulations. For < Z À2 , the results match the limit of rare mutations. More importantly, the plot shows that our general conclusion remains valid for a wide range of mutation probabilities: R M players with a moderately large aspiration are expected to prevail throughout a wide range of mutation values. For large mutation rates ( > Z À1 ), all types of reciprocators become equally probable and dominant with respect to ADs. As a result, the overall outcome of cooperation is enhanced for high mutation rates. This is an important point, as one expects that, e.g, in human interactions, errors of decision making, well captured by the behavioral mutations introduced here, may be sizable [14] , although at present a quantitative estimate is lacking. Needless to say, the results shown in Figs. 2 and 3 for N ¼ 5, remain valid for other values of N, in the sense that the physical order parameter of the model remains the ratio M=N (see x in Section 1 of [32] ). In summary, we have studied the evolutionary dynamics of repeated group interactions, in which individuals engage in an iterated NPD. Reciprocators are defined as individuals who may cooperate, contingent on their own individual assessment of what constitutes a fair group contribution. We found that evolution selects for a moderate, yet prevalent, concept of fairness in the population. This choice results from a detailed competition between the capacity to avoid continuous exploitation and the generosity of contributing in groups which are only partially cooperative. The prevalent concept of fairness that emerges in the population constitutes a compromise between too low aspiration levels, which lead reciprocators to extinction, and too high aspiration levels, associated with harsh coordination thresholds. Combined with the neutrality between different concepts of fairness, the emergent dynamics leads to cyclic behavior which, being ubiquitous in evolutionary games [8, 33] , also resembles the alternation between cooperation and defection which seems to pervade throughout human history [37] .
Financial support from FNRS Belgium (S. V. S., T. L.) and FCT-Portugal (F. C. S., J. M. P.) is gratefully acknowledged.
Summary

Evolutionary dynamics in infinite populations
1. 
Overview
Given that most mathematical terminology of population dynamics has been proposed for the case of infinite populations [1, 2] , we shall ground our analysis of evolutionary dynamics resulting from repeated group interactions on the dynamics obtained from infinitely large populations. In section 2, this discussion will be extended to arbitrary population sizes.
Let us assume an infinitely large, well-mixed population. Groups of N individuals, sampled randomly from the population, interact in repeated NPD's. There are two game strategies: AD and R M . R M players always contribute in the first round. Subsequently, they contribute only if at least M players did contribute in the previous round. ADs always opt for defection. We use x to denote the fraction of the population playing R M .
The expected average payoff associated with each strategy is given by [3] [4] [5] .
(1)
the expected net payoff a R M (AD) player acquires in a group
with k R M players and N-k AD players. These payoff values are defined as follows
where ! "r# is the average number of rounds and the Heaviside step function The payoff of an individual measures the success of his/her strategy in the population.
Successful strategies spread; the rest disappears. The replicator equation [1] Van Segbroeck, Pacheco, Lenaerts and Santos, Emergence of fairness in repeated group interactions, Supplemental Material (SM).
describes this dynamical process. The roots of the fitness difference
determine the non-trivial equilibria of the replicator dynamics.
In the following section we detail the analysis of showing that it can be written as
with ! " = F N and
. (5) We also prove several properties of the polynomial R(x) that allow us to come up with a detailed analysis of the roots of Q(x). This analysis consists of a general part, valid for 1<M<N, and the degenerate cases M=1 and M=N. 
If M=N, our analysis consists of five cases again. The first three are exactly the same as for 1<M<N, discussed in the previous paragraph. The final two read as follows: (iv) for 
If M=1, R M is essentially the same as unconditional cooperation, making the analysis independent of . There are only two cases: (i) for , we have
[ ].
Detailed analysis of Q(x)
In section 1.1 we sketch the evolutionary dynamics of an infinitely large, well-mixed population of individuals playing the repeated N-person Prisoner's Dilemma (NPD).
Here, we study in detail the direction of evolution by analyzing the fitness difference Van Segbroeck, Pacheco, Lenaerts and Santos, Emergence of fairness in repeated group interactions, Supplemental Material (SM).
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The population is in equilibrium when
The payoff differences in this equation are given by (see Equation (2))
Note that we use r as a shorter notation for the average number of rounds ! "r# . The payoff difference at the right-hand side of Equation (7) is given by ,
so that Equation (7) reduces to .
This allows us to rewrite Equation (6) as follows .
Since ,
we have that .
By introducing the polynomial ,
can be written as follows .
In the following section, we analyze the shape of , assuming , later on followed by the analysis for the degenerate cases and . Together, these results prove the classification of all possible dynamical scenarios shown in Fig. S1 .
Analysis for 1<M<N
The following lemma facilitates proving the main result of this section, comprised in Proposition a.1. Proof: The first two properties follow immediately from the definition of . We now prove the third property. First we rewrite as follows
. (15) By substituting by , we obtain ,
where . The polynomial is of the form , with .
Noting that
, we obtain the following expression for
. (18) The polynomial
Van Segbroeck, Pacheco, Lenaerts and Santos, Emergence of fairness in repeated group interactions, Supplemental Material (SM).
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so that
and
Therefore, we can write the derivative of
It is clear that
Since
Following Equation Supplemental Material -page 9 ! 0 < z < z corresponds to 
2) If
, then for al .
3) If
Proof:
1.i) Let . We obtain the following inequality by applying Lemma a.1
for all
1.ii) For
! r = r , we have
To prove that is a double root, we show that and . 
Calculating the derivative of gives us .
Since , it follows that ,
which proves that is a double root. 2) For , is positive in 0, 1, and :
1.iii)
.
Since increases monotonically in and decreases monotonically in , it follows automatically that for all .
3) For , then . Therefore, decreases monotonically between 0 and 1.
Since and , it follows that for all . !
Analysis for M=N
Let us derive an expression for , which is valid for , starting from Equation (6) . By calculating the fitness differences (33) and ,
we arrive at the following expression for :
. 
Analysis for M=1
For M=1, Equation (4) reduces to
Therefore, ,
which proves the proposition below. Supplemental Material -page 13
Evolutionary dynamics in finite populations
Overview
We consider a well-mixed population of constant size Z. Suppose that only two strategies are present in the population: AD and R M , M being fixed at one specific value.
The expected payoff associated with each of these two strategies is given by [3, 4] ,
where k denotes the number of R M players in the population.
Strategies evolve according to a mutation-selection process defined in discrete time. At each time step, the strategy of one randomly selected individual A is updated. With probability , A undergoes a mutation. He/she adopts a strategy drawn randomly from the space of available strategies, which includes the strategy AD and the N strategies R M ( ). With probability , another randomly selected individual B acts as a role model for A. The probability that A adopts the strategy of B
[ ]
#1
. A sticks to his/her former strategy with probability .
This update rule is known as the pairwise comparison rule [6, 7] . We used f A and f B to denote the fitness of individual A and B, respectively. The parameter , in EGT called the intensity of selection, measures the contribution of fitness to the update process. In the limit of strong selection ( ), the probability p is either zero or one, depending on f A and f B . In the limit of weak selection ( ), p is always equal to , irrespective of the fitness of A and B.
If the mutation probability is sufficiently small, the population will never contain Van Segbroeck, Pacheco, Lenaerts and Santos, Emergence of fairness in repeated group interactions, Supplemental Material (SM).
more than two different strategies simultaneously. The time between two mutation events is usually so large that the population will always evolve to a homogeneous state, i.e., to a state in which all individuals adopt the same strategy, before the next mutation occurs. The dynamics can now be approximated by means of an embedded Markov chain whose states correspond to the different homogeneous states of the population [8] [9] [10] [11] . Let us denote the list of available strategies as S i ( ). The transition matrix collects the different (transition) probabilities for the population to move from one state to the other. Specifically, is the probability that a population in state S i will end up in state S j after the occurrence of one single mutation. This probability is given by , where is the probability that a S j mutant takes over a resident population of S i individuals. The diagonal of the transition matrix is defined by . The normalized left eigenvector associated with eigenvalue 1 of matrix determines the stationary distribution, i.e, the fraction of time the population spends in each of the homogeneous states of the population [12, 13] .
The fixation probability can be calculated analytically as follows. Let us assume a population with k S i individuals and Z-k S j individuals. The probability that the number of S i individuals increases/decreases by one is given by ,
establishing also the probability [6, 7, 14] .
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Finally, it is important to highlight the difference between behavioural mutations and execution or implementation errors. In this context, the latter turns the analytical computation of the fitness values of each strategy cumbersome (see Eqs. (2) and (38)), being however easy to compute numerically. In fact, all results portrayed in Fig. 2 of the main text remain qualitatively unaltered if one adopts a small probability (!) associated with a limited fraction of implementation errors.
Computer simulations
All individual-based computer simulations start from a randomly initialized population of size . The population dynamics is implemented following the rules described 3b ).
